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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
NETJETS INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 2:12-cv-00059
Judge Gregory L. Frost
Magistrate Judge Abel

v.
INTELLIJET GROUP, LLC,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the following filings:
1.

Defendant IntelliJet Group, LLC’s (“IntelliJet”) motion for summary judgment
(ECF Nos. 48, 51), the response in opposition of Plaintiffs NetJets Inc.
(“NetJets”) and Columbia Insurance Company (“Columbia”) (ECF Nos. 62, 64),
and IntelliJet’s reply memorandum (ECF No. 67);

2.

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a sur-reply to Defendant IntelliJet’s reply
memorandum (ECF No. 69); and

3.

Defendant’s “motion in limine” to preclude evidence and testimony relating to the
report of Plaintiffs’ expert, Anne H. Chasser (ECF Nos. 47, 53), Plaintiffs’
response (ECF No. 63), and Defendant’s reply (ECF No. 68).

For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a surreply, GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the motion to preclude evidence and
testimony relating to Plaintiffs’ expert, and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
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I.
A.

NetJets’ Business

Plaintiff NetJets is a private aviation company headquartered in Columbus, Ohio.
NetJets’ predecessor, Executive Jet Aviation, originated in Columbus in 1964 as a private
business jet charter and aircraft management company. Today, NetJets markets itself as a full
service private aviation solution provider, offering among other things fractional ownership of jet
aircraft, jet lease management, and jet charter services. NetJets’ most widely known service is
fractional jet ownership, which allows for either the purchase or lease of a “share” of an aircraft
for a certain number of hours of usage each year. (For example, an owner of a 1/16th share has
50 hours annually for the specific aircraft type for which the share is purchased or leased.)
NetJets’ fractional ownership clients are therefore able to buy a share of a private jet at a fraction
of the cost of owning a whole aircraft.
In addition to fractional aircraft ownership, NetJets offers aircraft leasing through
Marquis Jet Partners, Inc. (“Marquis”), a company that NetJets acquired in 2010. Marquis offers
the “Marquis Jet Card,” which is a sublease of an aircraft in the NetJets program for a set number
of hours. The Marquis Jet Card program allows customers to access aircraft from NetJets’ fleet
without having to purchase or lease a fractional share. Before NetJets bought Marquis in 2010,
Marquis was NetJets’ largest customer for fractional shares, which Marquis would then resell
under its card program. In addition to the NetJets’ fractional share business and the Marquis
business, NetJets manages fleet operations internationally through an entity known as NetJets
Europe. Overall, NetJets provides more than 300,000 flights throughout 170 countries for its
customers.
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B.

The IntelliJet Software

In order to help manage its operations, NetJets began in the 1990s to develop its own
customized and proprietary software program, which it called “IntelliJet.” NetJets began
developing the software internally in 1994. Approximately six employees worked on the
software’s development, including the writing of the source code and the software’s debugging.
This first iteration of the IntelliJet software included modules for contracts and accounts,
reservations, flight following, crew management, airport management, billing, and crew
communications. NetJets did not license the IntelliJet software program to any third party.
Though there was some interest from third parties to acquire a license to use the software,
NetJets chose not to do so in order to maintain a competitive advantage in its business. From
1995 through 2000, no one other than certain employees of NetJets and NetJets’ related
companies had access to the IntelliJet software.
In the years following the development of the first version of the IntelliJet software,
NetJets’ employees worked on improvements and refinements to the software. NetJets
eventually launched an upgraded version of the software, which it dubbed “IntelliJet II.” The
latter software program performs the same functions as IntelliJet I, but, according to NetJets, is
greatly enhanced to provide additional features for NetJets owners.
According to testimony in the record, approximately 220 employees in NetJets’ IT
department support the IntelliJet system. NetJets invests a considerable amount of money to
maintain and develop upgrades to the software; the upgrade from “IntelliJet I” to “IntelliJet II,”
for example, cost NetJets approximately $20 million to implement. The IntelliJet software has
been and continues to be located on servers in Columbus, Ohio.
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Under previous versions of the IntelliJet software, NetJets’ customers (or “owners” as
NetJets calls them) did not have direct access to the IntelliJet software. With IntelliJet II,
however, there is now an “owner’s portal” that allows owners to access the system from the
internet and perform such tasks as changing their preferences or making flight reservations.
When owners log into the website, the INTELLIJET name is displayed on the screen. The
owner’s portal went “live” for NetJets owners in January 2013. While NetJets’ owners can now
see the INTELLIJET name when they log in to their NetJets’ accounts, there is no evidence or
testimony to indicate that the INTELLIJET name is displayed to non-NetJets owners who access
the NetJets website over the internet.
C.

NetJets’ Touting of the IntelliJet Software

NetJets considers the IntelliJet software to be proprietary and a trade secret. NetJets also
considers the IntelliJet software to be a vital part of its business and a point of emphasis when
discussing NetJets’ operation with customers and potential customers. Over the years, NetJets
has included discussion of the IntelliJet software’s functionality in newsletters to owners and in
literature provided to passengers on NetJets’ airplanes. NetJets’ brochures for both its fractional
share business and the Marquis Jet Card business have also mentioned the IntelliJet software.
NetJets consistently refers to the software as “IntelliJet®” to show that it has a registered
trademark in the software’s name.
NetJets also uses IntelliJet in tours of NetJets’ facility in Columbus, Ohio given to
customers and potential customers. During these tours, NetJets shows off some of the features of
the IntelliJet software. NetJets has also offered into evidence several magazine articles about
NetJets that have mentioned the IntelliJet software.
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D.

Defendant IntelliJet Group LLC

Defendant IntelliJet Group LLC is a Florida limited liability company that has operated
under the name “IntelliJet International” since 2005. IntelliJet International is in the business of
providing aircraft brokerage services, helping clients either sell or acquire jet aircraft. The
company deals primarily in Gulfstream, Bombardier, and Dassault jet aircraft ranging in price
from $10 million to $60 million. In recent years, IntelliJet International has also provided
aircraft leasing services through a division of the company and has expanded its business into the
area of aircraft management.
Gary Spivack is the founder and 50 percent owner of IntelliJet Group. Spivack testified
in his deposition that he was the person who came up with the name “IntelliJet” for his company.
Spivack conducted internet searches in 2005 to ascertain whether the name “IntelliJet” was being
used. Spivack testified that he found “seven or eight different IntelliJet trademarks,” including
the one held by NetJets. Spivack did not consider NetJets’ registration of the INTELLIJET
trademark to be an impediment to his use of “IntelliJet.” Since NetJets’ registration was for
software and Defendant IntelliJet did not sell software, Spivack saw “absolutely no problem
with” using the IntelliJet name for his company.
E.

Registration of the Marks at Issue

In December 1995, NetJets (then known as “Executive Jet, Inc.”) filed a federal
trademark application for the INTELLIJET mark. The United States Patent and Trademark
Office (“PTO”) approved the application and issued Registration Certificate No. 2,025,410 for
INTELLIJET in December 1996 for “computer software for managing aircraft leasing and
sales.” Nearly six years later, in September 2002, NetJets filed a Combined Declaration of Use
and Incontestability with the PTO, informing the PTO that the INTELLIJET mark had been used
5
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in commerce for five consecutive years after the date of registration. The PTO approved the
declaration, thereby granting INTELLIJET incontestability status under 15 U.S.C. § 1065. In
2003, Plaintiff Columbia obtained the INTELLIJET mark from NetJets in connection with its
purchase of certain intellectual property. Columbia owns the INTELLIJET mark, while NetJets
is the licensee.1
In May 2012, while this litigation was pending, Defendant filed a service mark
application with the PTO. Defendant sought registration of its “IntelliJet International” service
mark, which consists of “the word ‘INTELLIJET’, stylized and in block lettering, with a design
of a jet attached to the top of the letter ‘J’ and connected to the first letter ‘I’ by a line, and the
word ‘INTERNATIONAL’, stylized and in block lettering, underneath the word
‘INTELLIJET.’” As of the time of the summary judgment briefing in this case, Defendant’s
service mark application remained pending at the PTO.
F.

NetJets Files Suit against IntelliJet

Plaintiffs commenced this action in January 2012, alleging claims of trademark
infringement (Count I) and false designation of origin (Count II) under the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 26-35.) Plaintiffs’ complaint also alleges Ohio
law claims for deceptive trade practices under Ohio Rev. Code § 4165 et seq. (Count III) and for
common law unfair competition and injury to business reputation (Count IV). (Id. at ¶¶ 36-40.)
Defendant answered and filed a counterclaim. (ECF Nos. 10 and 11.) In Count I of an
amended counterclaim, Defendant pleaded a claim for cancellation of Plaintiffs’ INTELLIJET
mark on the basis of abandonment. (ECF No. 11 at ¶¶ 1-6.) Defendant also pleaded in Count II
1

In their briefing in opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs consistently uses
“INTELLIJET” (i.e., in all capital letters) when referring to the registered trademark and “IntelliJet” when
referring to the software itself. The Court accordingly does the same in this Opinion and Order.
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of the amended counterclaim a claim for unfair competition under Ohio law. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-10.)
This Court later granted Defendant leave to file a second amended counterclaim. (ECF No. 73.)
Defendant’s second amended counterclaim added to Count I a claim for cancellation of
Plaintiffs’ mark based on a theory that NetJets’ registration was “void ab initio” because NetJets
was not using the mark in commerce as of the date that the trademark application claimed first
use of INTELLIJET. (ECF No. 82 at ¶ 7.)
Defendant IntelliJet has moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims for trademark
infringement and false designation of origin under the Lanham Act and on Defendant’s
counterclaim to cancel Plaintiffs’ registration of INTELLIJET. Defendant’s motion also
addresses Plaintiffs’ claim of common law trademark infringement contained in Count I of the
complaint along with the Lanham Act claim.
II.
As an initial matter, the Court addresses Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a sur-reply to
Defendant’s reply in support of summary judgment. (ECF No. 69.) Plaintiffs ask the Court for
an opportunity to respond to Defendant’s argument, raised for the first time in Defendant’s reply,
that Plaintiffs did not assert a claim in this case for common law trademark infringement. (Id.)
Plaintiffs attached their proposed sur-reply to the motion for leave. (ECF No. 69-1.)
The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file their sur-reply. In its motion for
summary judgment, Defendant made a merits-based argument that Plaintiffs lacked common law
trademark rights. In its Reply, Defendant changed course, suddenly objecting “strenuously” to
Plaintiffs’ claim to common law trademark rights on the basis that Plaintiffs did not plead or
otherwise put Defendant on notice that they claimed such rights in this lawsuit. (Def.’s Reply,
ECF No. 67 at PageID# 3771.) Accordingly, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Defendant
7
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raised a new argument in its reply that it did not raise in its original motion for summary
judgment. The Court therefore grants Plaintiffs’ motion for leave and deems the sur-reply
attached to Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to have been filed in this action. The Court has also
reviewed and considered Plaintiffs’ sur-reply in connection with its adjudication of Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment.
III.
Before proceeding to the merits of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Court
must also address Defendant’s motion, styled as a “motion in limine,” to preclude evidence and
testimony relating to the report of Plaintiffs’ expert, Anne Chasser. (ECF Nos. 47, 53.) Though
styled as a motion in limine, which is normally filed nearer to the time of trial, Defendant is
ostensibly asking the Court to disregard Chasser’s expert report and expert testimony in
connection with the decision on Defendant’s summary judgment motion.
Chasser is a former Assistant Commissioner of Trademarks for the PTO and has worked
in the trademark and branding industry for 35 years. As an assistant commissioner, Chasser had
responsibility over various aspects of trademark operations at the PTO, including policy
formation, trademark examination, trademark office practices, and trademark filing systems.
Chasser has opined in her expert report that (1) NetJets’ INTELLIJET mark is valid and has
become incontestable, (2) NetJets has common law trademark rights, and (3) there is a likelihood
of confusion as between Defendant’s IntelliJet service mark and Plaintiffs’ INTELLIJET mark.
Defendant seeks to exclude Chasser’s testimony on the basis that she opines on
impermissible legal conclusions. Defendant also contends that the Court should exclude
Chasser’s opinions because they have no “independent factual basis.” In other words, Defendant

8

Case: 2:12-cv-00059-GLF-MRA Doc #: 85 Filed: 12/19/13 Page: 9 of 27 PAGEID #: 4877

argues that Chasser bases her opinions solely upon the “pre-selected facts and personal opinions”
that Plaintiffs’ counsel provided her. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 47 at PageID# 1388.)
Fed. R. Evid. 702 governs expert testimony:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.

Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a) provides that an expert’s opinion “is not objectionable
just because it embraces an ultimate issue.” A purported expert=s testimony is inadmissible,
however, if it offers nothing more than a legal conclusion. Woods v. Lecreux, 110 F.3d 1215,
1220 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1353-54 (6th Cir. 1994).
As to the argument that Chasser is opining on a legal conclusion, the Court agrees with
Defendant that an expert is not permitted to opine on the legal issue of whether a trademark is
valid. See Ideal World Marketing, Inc. v. Duracell, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 239, 244 n.2 (E.D.N.Y.
1998) (finding expert opinion that a mark was “suggestive and not descriptive” to be an
inadmissible legal opinion); Kerzner Int’l Ltd., Inc. v. Monarch Casino & Report, Inc., No. 3:06cv-232, 2009 WL 5066908, at *3 (D. Nev. Dec. 14, 2009) (finding expert’s opinion going to
whether registration was valid to be inadmissible; “[i]t is the role of the Court, not an expert
witness, to inform the jury of the law applicable to the case”). Chasser is doing just that in the
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portion of her expert report in which she opines that NetJets’ INTELLIJET mark is incontestable
and that NetJets enjoys common law rights in the trademark.
Notwithstanding the contents of Chasser’s report, Plaintiffs deny that Chasser is opining
on a legal issue. Plaintiffs say that Chasser, who is not a lawyer, is opining on factual issues
relating to whether there is a likelihood of confusion between NetJets’ INTELLIJET mark and
Defendant’s IntelliJet mark. (Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 63 at PageID# 3025.) Plaintiffs say nothing
of the opinion in Chasser’s expert report concerning the incontestability of the INTELLIJET
mark or of the opinion concerning NetJets’ common law trademark rights. Plaintiffs appear to
concede that an expert cannot opine on the legal issue of a trademark’s validity: indeed, they
distinguish Kerzner on the basis that the expert there sought to opine “in regards to the issuance
and validity of a registered mark.” (Id. at PageID# 3024.)
In light of the inadmissibility of expert opinion regarding the legal issue of trademark
validity, coupled with Plaintiffs’ implicit concession that Chasser cannot opine on such an issue,
the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s “motion in limine” with respect to the opinions on
incontestability and common law trademark rights contained in Chasser’s expert report.
The Court reaches a different conclusion, however, with regard to Defendant’s motion to
exclude Chasser’s opinion on the likelihood of confusion factors. Chasser’s opinion in this
regard is not a legal conclusion. See Whirlpool Properties, Inc. v. LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc.,
No. 1:03cv414, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1378, at *14 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2006) (allowing
expert testimony on likelihood of confusion because it “would assist the trier of fact”).
Defendant nevertheless argues that Chasser’s opinion as to likelihood of confusion is
inadmissible because it rests on an insufficient factual basis.
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It is true that Chasser’s opinion is based in large part upon facts of which she was
informed. But many of these facts are in the evidentiary record in this case, at least to this (the
summary judgment) stage. That Chasser did not consider certain evidentiary materials or
conduct independent investigation of certain facts are matters that go to the weight of her
testimony, not its admissibility. The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to the extent it
seeks to exclude Chasser’s testimony on the “likelihood of confusion” issue.
IV.
The Court now proceeds to the merits of Defendant IntelliJet’s motion for summary
judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment will not lie if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court must construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The movant has the initial burden of establishing
that there is no genuine issue of material fact to try. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 32223 (1986); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., 12 F.3d 1382, 1388-89 (6th Cir. 1993).
The non-movant must then come forward with specific facts, supported by the evidence in the
record, upon which a reasonable jury could find in its favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Plaintiffs have alleged trademark infringement (under the Lanham Act and common law)
against Defendant for Defendant’s use of the mark, “IntelliJet.” To establish trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove (1) that it owns a valid mark; (2) that
the defendant used the mark “in commerce” and without plaintiff's authorization; (3) that the
11
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defendant used the mark (or an imitation of it) “in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising” of goods or services; and (4) that the defendant’s use of the mark is
likely to confuse consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a). Plaintiffs have also alleged a Lanham Act
claim for false designation of origin, which must contains two elements: (1) the false designation
must have a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce and (2) the false designation
must create a likelihood of confusion. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494,
502 (6th Cir. 1998)
The “touchstone of liability” for federal trademark infringement claims brought under 15
U.S.C. § 1114 “is whether the defendant’s use of the disputed mark is likely to cause confusion
among consumers regarding the origin of the goods offered by the parties.” Daddy’s Junky
Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 1997); see also
Leelanau Wine Cellars, Ltd. v. Black & Red, Inc., 502 F.3d 504, 515 (6th Cir. 2007). Likewise,
a plaintiff’s success on a false designation of origin claim turns on whether the plaintiff can show
that the false designation creates a “likelihood of confusion.” Johnson, 149 F.3d at 502. Claims
for trademark infringement and false designation of origin under Ohio common law are subject
to the same standards as their federal counterparts. Mountain Top Beverage Group, Inc. v.
Wildlife Brewing N.B., Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (S.D. Ohio 2004); see also Daddy’s Junky
Music Stores, 109 F.3d at 288. “Additionally, ‘both Ohio and federal courts have recognized
that the same analysis applies to claims under Ohio’s statutory and common law of unfair
competition and the Lanham Act.’” Mountain Top Beverage, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 831-32 (quoting
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 626 n.2 (6th Cir.
2002)).
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But even before the Court reaches the question of whether there is a likelihood of
confusion, the plaintiff must show that it “has actually used the designation at issue as a
trademark, and that the defendant has also used the same or a similar designation, as a
trademark.” Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum. Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 753
(6th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not used
“INTELLIJET” as a trademark as a matter of law while Plaintiffs argue that they have. In other
words, the case turns in large part on whether Plaintiffs’ registration of the “INTELLIJET” mark
is valid. See Mountain Top Beverage, 338 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
A. Use in Commerce
Defendant’s primary argument is that Plaintiffs do not have enforceable trademark rights
in the “INTELLIJET” mark because they do not use the mark in commerce. Defendant relies on
the axiomatic concept that the right to register a mark depends upon the mark’s actual use in
trade. See e.g. Allard Enters., Inc. v. Advanced Programming Resources, Inc., 146 F.3d 350, 356
(6th Cir. 1998) (noting one of the “bedrock principles” of trademark law is that ownership rights
flow from actual use in the market). Arguing that the summary judgment evidence shows that
NetJets’ use of “INTELLIJET” is “solely internal,” Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have not
actually used “INTELLIJET” in commerce as a matter of law, rendering their trademark of
“INTELLIJET” invalid.
The Lanham Act contains a definition for “use in commerce”:
The term “use in commerce” means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary
course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of
this Act, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce—
(1) on goods when—
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(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays
associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the
nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on
documents associated with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services
and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more
than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person
rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services.
15 U.S.C. § 1127.
The parties’ briefing treats Plaintiffs’ IntelliJet software as a “good.” Because NetJets
has never sold the IntelliJet software, never advertised the IntelliJet software, and never
marketed the IntelliJet software, Defendant argues that NetJets has not actually used the
INTELLIJET mark in trade. Without actual use in trade, Defendant argues that there can be no
trademark.
In support of its argument for summary judgment, Defendant relies heavily on the
Federal Circuit’s recent decision in Lens.com v. 1-800 Contacts, 686 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
In Lens.com, the issue was the validity of the mark “LENS” for use in connection with
“computer software featuring programs used for electronic ordering of contact lenses in the field
of opthamology, optometry, and opticianry.” Id. at 1378. A competitor of Lens.com filed a
cancellation petition, alleging that Lens.com “fraudulently obtained or alternatively abandoned”
the “LENS” mark because Lens.com “never sold or otherwise engaged in the trade of computer
software.” Id. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) granted summary judgment
on the claim of abandonment on the ground that Lens.com’s software was “‘merely incidental to
its retail sale of contact lenses, and is not a ‘good in trade,’ i.e., ‘solicited or purchased in the
market place for [its] intrinsic value.’’” Id. (quoting 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com,
14
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Cancellation No. 92,049,925, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 212, *9 (T.T.A.B. May 18, 2010)). Lens.com
appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the decision of the TTAB.
Just as it is undisputed in this case that NetJets is not in the business of selling software,
so too was it uncontested in Lens.com that Lens.com does not sell software. Id. at 1380.
Focusing on 15 U.S.C. § 1127’s definition of “use in commerce,” the Federal Circuit first noted
that actual sale of goods is not required to satisfy the “use in commerce” requirement, “provided
that the goods are ‘transported’ in commerce.” Id. The Federal Circuit also noted, however, that
not every transport of a good will suffice to establish trademark rights. Rather, there must be an
element of “public awareness of the use” in order to establish ownership rights in a mark. Id.
(quoting Gen. Healthcare Ltd. v. Qashat, 364 F.3d 332, 337 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal quotations
omitted)).
Framing the issue as whether Lens.com’s software was a “good” transported in
commerce, the Federal Circuit first noted that “an article does not qualify as a good in trade
when that article is ‘simply the conduit through which [the applicant] renders services,’ i.e., is
‘the essence or gist of [the applicant’s] services.’” Id. (quoting In re Shareholders Data, 495
F.2d 1360, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1974)). Further, the Federal Circuit noted it to be “well established”
that an article is “not likely to be an independent good in trade” when it has no independent value
apart from the services rendered. Id. (citing Shareholders Data). While acknowledging that
distribution of software over the internet can satisfy the “use in commerce” requirement, the
Federal Circuit observed that “whether consumers actually associate a mark with software, as
opposed to other services, is a factual determination that must be conducted on a case-by-case
basis.” Id. at 1381-82. The court also listed a number of relevant factors to consider in this
determination, including whether the software “(1) is simply the conduit or necessary tool useful
15
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only to obtain applicant’s services; (2) is so inextricably tied to and associated with the service as
to have no viable existence apart therefrom; and (3) is neither sold separately from nor has any
independent value apart from the services.” Id. at 1382. “None of these factors need necessarily
be dispositive, but each may shed light on whether an applicant’s software is an independent
good being ‘sold or transported in commerce.’” Id. (emphasis in original).
Applying the law to the facts of Lens.com, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s
determination that “LENS” was not a valid mark because it was not used in commerce within the
meaning of the Lanham Act. Id. Though acknowledging the fact that the software “facilitates
the customers’ online order,” which is unique to each customer depending on what customers
view or purchase, the court nonetheless found that the “LENS” software was not used in
commerce in the sense required for a valid trademark. The court held that the software (1) was
merely the conduit through which Lens.com rendered its online retail services, (2) was
inextricably intertwined with the service that Lens.com provided to its customers, and (3) did not
have independent value apart from the online retail services for which Lens.com used it. Id.
Defendant urges this Court to follow the Federal Circuit’s lead in Lens.com. Like the
trademark registrant in Lens.com, NetJets does not sell the software associated with the
challenged trademark. Defendant therefore argues that NetJets’ IntelliJet software is merely the
“conduit” through which NetJets provides its services to customers. While the software may be
proprietary and valuable to NetJets as a tool that provides the company a competitive advantage,
Defendant argues that fact is not enough to satisfy the requisite “use in commerce” requirement
of the Lanham Act. In Defendant’s view, the INTELLIJET mark is associated with software that
is nothing more than an internal software program of NetJets. See also City Nat’l Bank v. OPGI
Management GP Inc. v. Gestion OPGI Inc., 106 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1668, 1678 (T.T.A.B. 2013)
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(rejecting trademark of “TREASURYNET” because the proprietary database to which it applied
was only for use by the respondent’s employees).
Plaintiffs, of course, disagree with the analysis Defendant posits. Plaintiffs argue that
they satisfy the “use in commerce” requirement because (1) NetJets has prominently and
continuously displayed the INTELLIJET mark since the time that NetJets developed the software
in 1995, (2) the software and its INTELLIJET mark have achieved public recognition, (3) the
software has been transported in interstate commerce, and (4) NetJets has licensed the software
to third parties. Citing the broad definition of what is considered “commerce” under the Lanham
Act, Plaintiffs identify these factors as proof that NetJets has used the INTELLIJET mark for a
commercial purpose.2
As an initial matter, the Court observes that Plaintiffs’ argument seems to conflate
“commerce” and “use in commerce.” “Commerce” is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 as “all
commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.” This is a broad definition, as
Congress has the power to regulate any activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995). Just because a mark might be used in
connection with activity that falls under the definition of “commerce,” however, does not mean
that the activity satisfies the “use in commerce” requirement for a valid trademark registration.
See Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting
that the Lanham Act uses the phrase “use in commerce” in “two different contexts).

2

Plaintiffs’ evidentiary support for these arguments comes, in large part, through the declarations of
Beverly Marsh and Anne Marie Thomas, both of whom identify and authenticate a number of documents
that Plaintiffs use to establish the aforementioned facts. Defendant objects to the Marsh and Thomas
declarations on various grounds. (ECF Nos. 65 and 66.) The Court overrules these objections and has
considered the materials in ruling upon Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
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In Planetary Motion, for example, the court noted that the distribution of software over
the internet for end users was a “use in commerce” for purposes of meeting the Lanham Act’s
“jurisdictional predicate.” Id. at 1194-95. But that circumstance alone did not lead inexorably to
the conclusion that the alleged owner of a software trademark used the mark in commerce for
purposes of obtaining ownership rights to the mark. “[T]he use of a mark in commerce also must
be sufficient to establish ownership rights for a plaintiff to recover against subsequent users
under section 43(a) [of the Lanham Act].” Id. at 1195 (emphasis in original). Ownership
requires “‘use in a way sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the marked goods in an
appropriate segment of the public mind as those of the adopter of the mark, . . . even without
evidence of actual sales.’” Id. (quoting New England Duplicating Co. v. Mendes, 190 F.2d 415,
418 (1st Cir. 1951)).
Plaintiffs identify a number of activities using the “INTELLIJET” mark as evidence that
the mark satisfies the Lanham Act’s “use in commerce” requirement. For example, NetJets
demonstrates the software for customers and potential customers and has provided information to
customers about the IntelliJet software in various newsletters and in-flight literature available to
NetJets customers. NetJets also emphasizes that it uses the software to “interact” with thirdparty vendors and to connect with “other externally-facing applications used by NetJets
employees.” As another example, NetJets notes that pilots and crew members use IntelliJet
software applications and access data using their Blackberry® phones. Further, NetJets contends
that it “utilizes” the IntelliJet software to sell aircraft. NetJets argues that the IntelliJet software
is “transported” in commerce through many of these uses and further emphasizes the fact that it
has licensed the software to related entities of NetJets. As of 2012, NetJets says that “there were
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at least 500 and potentially 750 users of IntelliJet software within NetJets and its related
entities.”
The Court does not doubt the value of the IntelliJet software. It is undisputed in this case
that the IntelliJet software is an integral part of NetJets’ operation and that NetJets has invested a
considerable amount of money in developing and improving the software. The Court even
recognizes that NetJets does, to some degree, publicize the existence and the functionality of the
IntelliJet software—and the INTELLIJET mark—in activities related to NetJets’ core business of
selling fractional ownership programs for aircraft and serving the air transportation needs of their
customers. But this does not mean that NetJets’ use of the INTELLIJET mark is “use in
commerce” within the meaning of the Lanham Act.
The Court finds the Federal Circuit’s decision in Lens.com to be highly persuasive in
deciding the “use in commerce” issue presented here. As in this case, it was not contested in
Lens.com that the trademark registrant did not sell the software at issue. Thus, the focus of the
case was whether the Lens.com software was a “good” that was “transported in commerce.”
Lens.com, 686 F.3d at 1380.
Applying the same factors as the Federal Circuit in Lens.com, the Court reaches the same
conclusion with respect to the INTELLIJET mark associated with NetJets’ IntelliJet software.
Just as with the software at issue in Lens.com, the IntelliJet software is simply the conduit
through which NetJets provides its services. To be sure, Plaintiffs have submitted a wealth of
documentary evidence and deposition testimony with regard to the importance of the IntelliJet
software to NetJets and the various ways that NetJets uses it to support virtually every aspect of
NetJets’ business. It is evident from the record that NetJets has invested a great deal of money
and manpower in the development of the IntelliJet software and has touted to customers and
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potential customers the ways in which IntelliJet enhances the NetJets experience. But the central
theme in all of the uses of the IntelliJet software is that they are all associated with obtaining
NetJets’ aviation services. NetJets is not marketing the software for the software’s sake: it is
using the software as the necessary tool to provide a high level of service to its customers.
Fundamentally, the use of the IntelliJet software by NetJets is no different than the use of the
“LENS” software at issue in Lens.com. In each case, the software is the conduit through which
the services are provided to customers.
As to the second factor, the software at issue in this case is “inextricably intertwined”
with the service that NetJets provides to its customers. In Lens.com, the court found that the
Lens.com software facilitated the customers’ online ordering, providing customers an enhanced
consumer experience that provided greater value to Lens.com’s online retail services. Id.
Similarly here, the IntelliJet software is inextricably intertwined with the comprehensive flight
services that NetJets provides. Though distribution of software over the internet is a commercial
use, the key question for trademark validity purposes is “whether consumers actually associate a
mark with software, as opposed to other services.” Id. at 1381 (emphasis in original).
Plaintiffs have offered evidence showing a multitude of ways in which NetJets has
highlighted for customers and potential customers the existence of the IntelliJet software and the
software’s capability. Plaintiffs have even shown evidence that it has shown the INTELLIJET
mark in reference to the software in materials distributed to customers and potential customers.
But the evidence also shows that the IntelliJet software’s existence is universally associated with
NetJets. In other words, INTELLIJET is revealed exclusively as part and parcel of the services
that NetJets provides. Like the software in Lens.com, this factor makes the IntelliJet software
inextricably intertwined and associated with NetJets’ aviation services. And the software has no
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viable existence apart from NetJets for the simple fact that NetJets does not sell the software or
otherwise make the software available to users in the marketplace. To the contrary, the IntelliJet
software is proprietary to NetJets and NetJets considers it a trade secret that gives it an edge on
its competition.
Finally, the third factor also cuts against trademark validity. It is not disputed that
Defendants do not sell the IntelliJet software separately from the services that NetJets provides.
Nor can the Court find that the IntelliJet software has “independent value apart from the
services” provided by NetJets. Lens.com, 686 F.3d at 1382. While the Court has no doubt that
the IntelliJet software would have value if it were sold in the marketplace, such is not the relevant
inquiry here. This factor, like the others, is supposed to “shed light on whether [the] software is
an independent good being ‘sold or transported in commerce.’” Id. (emphasis in original).
There is no evidence in this case that NetJets’ IntelliJet software has an “independent value” as it
relates to NetJets’ customers and potential customers. The software is not a separate good or
commodity sold or transported in commerce; rather, the software enhances the overall
experience of NetJets’ customers and is an integral part of NetJets’ business operation. Just as
the “LENS” software in Lens.com could not be trademarked despite the software providing
greater value to Lens.com’s online retail services, id., so too is INTELLIJET not validly
trademarked.
The purpose of a trademark is to distinguish goods and to identify the source of goods. In
re Sones, 590 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc.,
183 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). To this end, the Lanham Act requires an applicant to
show “use in commerce,” which is “the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade.”
15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also Modular Cinemas of Am. v. Mini Cinemas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 578,
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582 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (“The gist of trademark rights is its actual use in trade.”). The Court agrees
with Defendant that NetJets is not using the INTELLIJET mark in this manner. Accordingly, the
Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the Lanham Act claims alleged in
Counts I and II of Plaintiffs’ complaint.
B. Likelihood of Confusion
Even if Plaintiffs can show that NetJets’ use of the INTELLIJET mark is a “use in
commerce” within the meaning of the Lanham Act, there must also be a “likelihood of
confusion” between the parties’ respective uses of “IntelliJet” in order for Plaintiffs to have a
valid claim. Whether an alleged infringer’s use of the disputed mark is likely to cause confusion
among consumers regarding the origin of the goods offered by the parties, is “[t]he touchstone of
liability.” Interactive Prods. Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 694 (6th
Cir. 2003).
Because we have found that Plaintiffs do not have a protectable mark in INTELLIJET,
however, this Court need not address whether there is a likelihood of confusion between the
marks. See e.g. Papa Ads, LLC v. Gatehouse Media, Inc., 485 F. App’x 53, 56 (6th Cir. 2012);
T. Marzetti Co. v. Roskam Baking Co., 680 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2012).
C. Abandonment
Defendant’s motion also seeks summary judgment on Count I of its amended
counterclaim, seeking cancellation of NetJets’ registration of the INTELLIJET trademark on the
grounds of abandonment. Though Defendant has since filed a second amended counterclaim
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alleging an additional basis of cancellation (i.e., that NetJets’ registration was “void ab initio”),
the Court will address the abandonment counterclaim in the interests of judicial economy.3
“Abandonment” is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Under the statute, a mark is deemed
“abandoned” when either of the following occurs:
(1) When its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume such use.
Intent not to resume may be inferred from circumstances. Nonuse for 3
consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment.
“Use” of a mark means the bona fide use of such mark made in the ordinary
course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.
(2) When any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as well
as commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods or
services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to lose its
significance as a mark. Purchaser motivation shall not be a test for determining
abandonment under this paragraph.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphasis added). Abandonment is a ground for cancelling a mark even when
that mark is otherwise incontestable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(2).
As Defendant acknowledges in its motion for summary judgment, most cases of alleged
abandonment of a trademark involve a situation where the owner was at one point making
commercial use of the mark. Abandonment may also be established, however, through proof
that a registrant is not using or has never used its mark in commerce. See e.g. Imperial Tobacco
Ltd. v. Philip Morris Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 1579-82 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding abandonment of
mark on basis of nonuse). Indeed, the Lens.com case analyzed above was an abandonment case:
the court affirmed the TTAB’s decision that the mark at issue was not in “use in commerce” and
3

At a telephone status conference convened on November 20, 2013, this Court set a briefing schedule for
dispositive motions relating to Defendant’s second amended counterclaim. (ECF No. 83.) The Court still
deemed Defendant’s motion for summary judgment submitted and ripe for decision, including the part of
the motion seeking summary judgment on Defendant’s counterclaim for cancellation on the basis of
abandonment. Because Defendant’s second amended counterclaim still contains in Count I a claim for
cancellation based on abandonment, the Court addresses that issue here, as the parties have fully briefed
it.
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was therefore abandoned within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1127. See Lens.com, 686 F.3d at
1383.
This Court has already found above that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ Lanham Act claims because NetJets has not placed INTELLIJET in “use in
commerce” within the meaning of the Act. In light of the Court’s decision on the “use in
commerce” issue, Defendant is likewise entitled to summary judgment on its counterclaim for
cancellation of the INTELLIJET mark on the basis of abandonment.
D. Common Law Trademark and Ohio Statutory Claims
Defendant also moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim of common law
trademark infringement. Though Defendant contends in its reply brief that Plaintiffs did not
plead a claim for common law trademark infringement, the Court disagrees. Count I of
Plaintiffs’ Complaint expressly alleges infringement under both the Lanham Act and Ohio
common law.
On the merits, the Court finds that its grant of summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Lanham
Act claims also renders summary judgment appropriate on Plaintiffs’ common law claims. As
Plaintiffs themselves observe, an analysis of Ohio common law trademark rights is the same as
federal law rights. (Pls.’ Opp’n, ECF No. 64 at PageID# 3073.) See Abercrombie & Fitch, 280
F.3d at 626 n.1 (citing Leventhal & Assocs., Inc. v. Thomson Cent. Ohio, 128 Ohio App. 3d 188,
714 N.E. 2d 418, 423 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 920
(6th Cir. 2003) (“Because trademark claims under Ohio law follow the same analysis as those
under the Lanham Act, our discussion of the federal trademark claims will therefore encompass
the state trademark claims as well.”). Accordingly, for the same reasons articulated above with
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respect to Plaintiffs’ Lanham Act claims, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiffs’ common law trademark infringement claim contained in Count I of the complaint.
E. Attorney’s Fees
Section 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 allows the Court to award attorney’s
fees to the prevailing party “in exceptional cases.” Defendant argues that this is an “exceptional
case” that calls for the award of attorney’s fees. The Court denies Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on the attorney’s fees question, as an award of fees is not appropriate.
In applying 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) to a prevailing defendant, the Sixth Circuit has held that
an “exceptional” case is one “where a plaintiff brings a suit that could fairly be described as
oppressive.” Eagles, Ltd. v. American Eagle Foundation, 356 F.3d 724, 728 (6th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotations omitted). An award of attorney’s fees is not appropriate if the plaintiff
brought suit under a colorable, albeit unsuccessful, argument. Id. (quoting American Council of
Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. American Bd. of Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 185 F.3d
606, 625 (6th Cir. 1999)). The test for whether a Lanham Act suit is oppressive “requires an
objective inquiry into whether the suit was unfounded when it was brought and a subjective
inquiry into the plaintiff’s conduct during litigation.” Id. at 729.
The Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that this is an “exceptional case” under 15
U.S.C. § 1117(a). Though the Court was ultimately unconvinced by Plaintiffs’ arguments, the
Court finds there to have been at least a colorable argument that NetJets used INTELLIJET in a
manner that satisfied the “use in commerce” requirement for valid trademark registration. It is
within the realm of possibility to obtain a trademark over software, even if the software is not
necessarily sold to end users. See generally Planetary Motion, 261 F.3d 1188. Given this
possibility, combined with the importance of the IntelliJet software to NetJets’ overall business,
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NetJets’ use of the INTELLIJET mark for commercial purposes, and the fact that Defendant is
using the IntelliJet name in an aviation-related enterprise, the Court is unable to find that this
lawsuit was objectively unfounded.
Moreover, it is significant that this Court relies heavily upon the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Lens.com as persuasive authority guiding the Court’s decision in this case. For
purposes of the attorney’s fees issue, it is noteworthy that the Federal Circuit did not decide
Lens.com until August 3, 2012, several months after Plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit. Thus,
even if the Court were inclined to decide that Plaintiffs did not have a colorable argument in light
of the holding in Lens.com, the Court is unable to conclude as a matter of law that Plaintiffs
brought an “oppressive” suit in this case when Plaintiffs did not have the benefit of the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Lens.com at the time they sued Defendant in this case.
INTELLIJET has not been in “use in commerce” as defined in the Lanham Act, but the
Court does not find the legal conclusion in this regard to be as clear cut as Defendant
characterizes it. The Court therefore denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the
issue of Defendant’s recovery of attorney’s fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
V.
For the reasons articulated above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.

The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a sur-reply. (ECF No. 69.)

2.

The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s motion to

preclude evidence and testimony relating to the expert report of Anne H. Chasser. (ECF Nos. 47,
53.) The Court grants the motion as to Chasser’s legal opinion regarding the validity and
incontestability of Plaintiffs’ INTELLIJET mark and regarding common law trademark rights,
but denies the motion with respect to Chasser’s opinion regarding likelihood of confusion.
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3.

The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 48 and 51.) The Court grants summary judgment to
Defendant on the Lanham Act claims alleged in Counts I and II of Plaintiffs’ complaint and on
the common law trademark claim included in Count I of the complaint. The Court also grants
summary judgment to Defendant on Count I of Defendant’s second amended counterclaim as it
relates to cancellation on the basis of abandonment. The Court denies summary judgment on the
issue of Defendant’s recovery of attorney’s fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Gregory L. Frost
GREGORY L. FROST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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